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Absztrakt.  
Egy könyvkiadó vállalatot vizsgálunk. A kiadó kiadványait a szokásos értékesítési láncon 
(kis- és nagykereskedelem) keresztül értékesíti. A kérdés az, hogy egy új könyv példányait 
hogyan  allokálja  az  értékesítési  láncban.  Feltételezzük,  hogy  a  kereslet  ismert,  Poisson-
eloszlású.  A  készletezés  költségeit  szintén  ismertnek  tételezzük  fel.  Cél  a  költségek 
minimalizálása. 
 
Kulcsszavak: Optimalizálás, Újságárusfiú probléma, Játékelmélet, Készletgazdálkodás 
 
 
 
Abstract. 
The aim of the paper is to analyze a practical real world problem. A publishing house is given. 
The publishing firm has contacts to a number of wholesaler / retailer enterprises and direct 
contact to customers to satisfy the market demand. The book publishers work in a project 
industry.  The  publisher  faces  with  the  problem  to  allocate  the  stocks  of  a  given,  newly 
published  book  to  the  wholesaler  and  retailer,  and  to  hold  some  copies  to  satisfy  the 
customers direct from the publisher. The distribution of the demand is unknown, but it can be 
estimated. The costs consist of inventory holding and shortage, backorder costs. The decision 
maker wants to minimize these relevant costs. 
 
The  problem  can  be  modeled  as  a  one-warehouse  and  N-retailer  supply  chain  with  not 
identical demand distribution. The problem structure is similar that of a newsvendor model. It 
is assumed that the demand distribution follows a Poisson distribution. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Inventory  games  are  investigated  in  the  last  years.  A  number  of  publications  analyze 
newsvendor-, or newsboy-type inventory games. One of the first papers on this field was 
published by Lippman and McCardle (1997). They have examined  a newsboy-type inventory 
game with two players and dependent random demands. They look for a Nash equilibrium 
and investigate possible decision rules. 
 
Other  papers  investigate  a  similar  situation,  but  more  than  two  players.  This  papers  are 
Montrucchio and Scarsini (2007), and Müller, Scarsini, and Shaked (2002). The last paper 
deals with the cooperative solution of the newsboy-type inventory game, and shows that there 
exists  a  core  of  this  game.  Another  paper  examines  the  connection  between  Nash  and 
Stackelberg solutions of newsvendor problems. (Serin (2007)) She has shown that there exists 
such a situation, where these two type of game solutions have the same. Other applications 
examine  the  back-orders  in  solutions  (Netessine  et  al.  (2006)),  and  the  multi-echelon 
problems of inventory control of newsvendor games. (Rogers and Tsubakitani (1991)) 
 
The aim of the paper is to analyze a practical real world problem. The publishing firm has 
contacts to a number of wholesaler / retailer enterprises and direct contact to customers to 
satisfy the market demand. The book publishers work in a project industry. The publisher 
faces  with  the  problem  to  allocate  the  stocks  of  a  given,  newly  published  book  to  the 
wholesaler  and retailer,  and to hold some copies to satisfy the  customers direct from the 
publisher. The distribution of the demand is unknown, but it can be estimated. The costs 
consist  of  inventory  holding  and  shortage,  backorder  costs.  The  decision  maker  wants  to 
minimize these relevant costs. 
 
The problem is modeled as a one-warehouse and N-retailer supply chain with not identical 
demand  distribution.  The  problem  structure  is  similar  that  of  a  newsvendor  model.  It  is 
assumed that the demand distribution follows a Poisson distribution. We have chosen this 
distribution,  because  the  demand  process  of  selling  books  can  be  characterized  with  this 
random process. 
 
The paper organizes, as follows.  In the second section we show the parameters, decision 
variables and the costs functions of the model. The next section deals with the properties of 
the  model,  and  solves  the  model.  The  fourth  section  supplies  a  numerical  example  to 
characterize the structure of an optimal solution. And last we summarize the results of the 
paper. 
 
 
2.  The model 
 
We will use the following notations. 
 
Parameters of the model: 
 
- n  number of the retailer, 
- cf  fixed costs of the publishing house, 
- cv  variable costs of the publishing house, 
- p  selling price of the book,   4 
- h0  inventory holding costs of the publishing house, 
- hi  inventory holding costs of the retailers, (i=1,2,…,n), 
- Di  random demand for retailer i, (i=1,2,…,n), 
- λi  parameter of the Poisson distribution for retailer i, (i=1,2,…,n). 
 
The probability of demand of the Poisson distribution has the next form: 
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We assume that the random demands of the retailers are independent. This assumption means 
that  the  cumulated  probability  of  the  demand  for  the  publishing  house  follows  a  Poisson 
distribution, as well: 
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and the cumulated distribution 
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Decision variables: 
 
- Q0  the number if the books published by the publishing house, 
- Qi  the number of the ordered books from the publishing house. 
 
We can assume that the number of published books is not higher than that of books ordered 
by retailers from publishing house. It is formulated, as 
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This problem can be modeled as a one-warehouse and n-retailer supply chain. The material 
flow of the system is depicted in figure 1.   5 
 
Figure 1. Material flow of the system. (One-warehouse n-retailer.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Let us now model the cost functions. The model consists of (n + 1) costs functions: cost 
function of the publishing house and n cost functions of the retailers. We model the case from 
the  point  of  view  of  the  publishing  house.  The  publishing  house  wants  to  minimize  the 
relevant cost, so that the house does not know the precise costs of the retailers, but estimates 
them. 
 
First  we  construct  the  cost  function  of  the  publishing  house.  We  assume  that  the  costs 
function consists of fixed costs, variable costs of the publishing house, and the sum inventory 
holding costs and lost sales. The form of the cost function is the following: 
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The function K0(Q0) is modeled, as 
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The first part of function F0(Q0) shows the average inventory holding costs. The second part 
is the average lost sales costs. 
 
The cost functions of the retailers are modeled as a pure newsboy problem. We assume that 
the  publishing  house  has  no  information  about  the  costs  parameters  of  the  retailers,  only 
Q0 
Publishing 
house 
Q2 
Q3 
Q1 
2. retailer 
3. retailer 
1. retailer   6 
estimations about the costs. The fixed and variable costs of retailers are totally unknown for 
the publishing house. The cost functions are 
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The goal of the retailers is to minimize the newsboy-type inventory costs. A retailer has no 
information about the ordering rules of the other retailers, so these decisions are independent 
each other. 
 
We can now summarize our model, as a game theoretic model. The problem is the following: 
 
( ) min ® i i Q C , (i=0,1,2,…,n),                (1) 
 
such that 
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In the next section we examine the offered model. We will show that this model is a simple 
game and we look for the optimal solution of this play. 
 
 
3. Some properties of the model and its solution 
 
The problem (1)-(2) can be interpreted, as a Nash game with (n + 1) player. We prove that the 
Nash solution of this inventory game is Pareto equilibrium, so the competitive solution is in 
this special case a cooperative game solution, as well. 
 
Property 1. 
The optimal solution of model (1)-(2) is a Nash equilibrium. 
 
Proof. Let us assume that we have calculated the optimal solution of the problem, and optimal 
solution is values { }
n
i
o
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o Q0 , and let 
us fix the optimal retailer quantities { }
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This problem can be solved, and the optimal solution is a Nash solution. 
 
If we investigate a retailer i, then the next problem must be solved: 
   7 
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The solution of this problem is very simple, see for example Naddor (1966). With this last 
proposition we have proved this property. 
 
The property have shown that the equilibrium this Nash game can be calculated, as a Pareto 
efficient solution. 
 
Property 2. 
The Nash equilibrium of model (1)-(2) is a Pareto optimal solution, as well. 
 
Proof. The first property holds for the optimal solution of problem (1)-(2). Let us reformulate 
the problem: 
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The optimal solution of this problem is a Nash solution, and the cumulated cost function is a 
Pareto optimum. So the optimal solution of this problem is a cooperative solution of game 
(1)-(2). With this proposition we have proved that the solution is a cooperative equilibrium for 
this problem. 
 
This last property helps us to determine the optimal solution of the model (1)-(2). The optimal 
orderings can be calculated, as the optimal solution of optimization problem (3)-(4): 
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Let us now determine the optimal decisions in this model. The model (1)-(2) can be solved 
with Lagrange function. The Lagrange function is 
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The optimal solution for this case is 
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for the number of the published books and 
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for the ordered books. Here the optimal solutions are values 
o
i Q , (i=0,1,2,…,n). In this model 
the optimal solution is determined in dependence of the parameter λ. A possible algorithm is 
shown in the next section. 
 
 
4.  A numerical example 
 
The supply chain consists of the publishing house and three retailers, n = 3. In this numerical 
example we assume that the selling price is equal to 50, i.e. p = 50. The fixed cost of the 
publishing house is 100, i.e. cf  = 100, the variable cost is 20, i.e. cv = 20. We assume that the 
inventory holding costs are equal for the publishing house and the retailers, and h = h0 = h1 = 
h2 = h3 = 10. 
 
The distribution of the demand is Poisson distribution with parameters: λ1 = 50, λ2 = 25, and 
λ3 = 30. The problem (3)-(4) in our case is 
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such that   9 
 
0 0 3 2 1 £ - + + Q Q Q Q . 
 
Using the results of (5)-(6), the optimal solution is 
 
λ =11,  109 0 =
o Q ,  52 1 =
o Q ,  26 2 =
o Q ,  31 3 =
o Q . 
 
The minimal cost of the publishing house is  
 
( ) 95 . 2364 0 0 =
o Q C ,  ( ) 79 . 136 1 1 =
o Q C ,  ( ) 46 . 102 2 2 =
o Q C ,  ( ) 643 . 113 3 3 =
o Q C . 
 
The total costs of this supply chain are 2717.84. 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have shown a supply chain with newsvendor-type inventory holding costs. 
We have investigated a real publishing house with retailers. The publishing house wants to 
determine  optimal  number  of  published  books  and  the  expected  books  ordering  of  the 
retailers. The random demands for books of the retailers are known from former demands. 
The  aim  of  the  publishing  house  is  to  minimize  the  expected  costs  so  that  the  retailers 
minimize the inventory holding costs. 
 
To solve the problem, we have shown that this problem leads to a game-theoretic model. The 
players of the game are the publishing house and the retailers. The structure of the problem is 
very simple, so the Nash equilibrium of the problem is a Pareto efficient solution, as well. It 
means that in this case the Nash equilibrium is a solution of a cooperative game. 
 
In a next paper we can analyze a situation with not independent retailers demand, as it is 
assumed by Montrucchio and Scarsini (2007), or Serin (2007).   10 
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